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We study several popular monetary models which generate a non-
degenerate stationary distribution of money holdings. Across these
environments, our principal finding is as follows: a monetary policy
that sets long run nominal interest rates to zero (the Friedman rule)
does not typically maximize ex-post social welfare if it can generate
redistributive effects. An increase in the rate of growth of the money
supply has the standard partial-equilibrium effect of making money a
less desirable asset thereby decreasing the utility of all moneyholders.
A second, general-equilibrium effect, is a transfer from one type of
agent to the other. For each environment, when the rate of growth of
the money supply is not too high, an increase in the latter away from
∗Iowa State University, University of Missouri, and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, respectively. We thank Narayana Kocherlakota, Steve Russell, Rajesh Singh, and
Randy Wright for useful comments. The views expressed here are those of the authors
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City or the Federal
Reserve System.
†Corresponding author: Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
925 Grand Blvd., Kansas City, MO 64198; Phone: 816-881-2335; Fax: 816-881-2199; E-
mail: antoine.martin@kc.frb.org
1
the Friedman rule may produce a transfer effect that dominates the
partial equilibrium effect thereby rendering the Friedman rule ex-post
suboptimal.
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1 Introduction
Until 1951, the Federal Reserve System of the US explicitly pegged nomi-
nal interest rates on the Treasury’s debt obligations. In March 1951, the
Treasury-Fed Accord ended this explicit arrangement, ostensibly freeing the
Fed to pursue an independent monetary policy. It was natural for economists
to ask: how should an independent yet benevolent central bank conduct mon-
etary policy? Milton Friedman (1969) offered a simple and yet deep answer
(the Friedman rule): since money is an asset, the central bank ought to
change the stock of outstanding money at a rate that causes the real rate
of return on money to equal the real return rate on other physical assets.
Over the next three decades, researchers have studied Friedman’s dictum us-
ing the two main workhorse models for monetary theory, the infinitely-lived
representative agent (ILRA) model and the overlapping generations (OG)
model. In the context of infinitely-lived-representative-agent models, when
lump-sum taxes and transfers are available, the Friedman rule is the optimal
monetary policy.1 The seminal reference on the Friedman rule in OG models
is Wallace (1984). Wallace shows that once heterogeneity among agents is
explicitly considered, it may be impossible for the central bank to settle on
one monetary policy rule, including the Friedman rule, that benefits every
agent.
By construction, monetary policy cannot have redistributive effects in
representative-agent models. Yet these effects are known to be quantitatively
1See, for instance, Woodford (1990) and Ljunqvist and Sargent (2000). Note that
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996) and Correia and Teles (1996) extend this to the case
in which other distortionary taxes are present.
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significant and important (see, for example, Erosa and Ventura, 2002). For
agents holding a disproportionate amount of money, their welfare is clearly
negatively related to inflation. In contrast, agents holding relatively less
money can realize welfare gains from higher inflation. This paper shows the
following: If monetary policy can have redistributive effects then, a monetary
policy that sets long-run nominal interest rates to zero – that is the Friedman
rule – does not typically maximize ex-post social welfare, and in some cases,
it does not maximize ex-ante welfare. Indeed, a necessary condition for the
Friedman rule to be suboptimal ex-post is that changes in the rate of growth
of the money supply have redistributive effects.
We study different monetary environments in which heterogeneity among
agents produces a long-run non-degenerate distribution of money holdings.
In particular, we study three different monetary economies: 1) the random-
matching model of money due to Lagos and Wright (2002), 2) a turnpike
model of the type introduced by Townsend (1980), and 3) an overlapping
generations (OG) model with stochastic relocation as in Schreft and Smith
(1997) and Smith (2002). In each model, agents have heterogeneous money
holdings in equilibrium. In the LW frameworks the heterogeneity comes from
differences in agents’ preferences.2 In the turnpike environment it arises from
different endowment patterns. In the OG model agents alive in the same
period may be from different generations. Our results are robust to these
various ways of obtaining heterogenous money holdings in equilibrium.
In each of the models we study, an increase in the rate of growth of
2In the appendix we also study a textbook money-in-the-utility-function infinite horizon
economy. In that model, as in the LW framework, heterogeneity of money holdings occurs
because agents have different preferences.
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the money supply away from the Friedman rule has two effects. First, the
standard partial-equilibrium effect is to make money a less desirable asset
thereby decreasing the utility of all agents. Second, the general-equilibrium
effect is a redistributive transfer from one type of agent to the other. We
show, for each environment, examples for which the transfer effect dominates
the partial equilibrium effect when the rate of growth of the money supply
is not too high.
Markets are assumed to be incomplete, implying it is impossible to undo
transfers by means of non-distortionary fiscal policy. Deviating from the
Friedman rule therefore produces multiple Pareto optimal yet non-comparable
allocations. This assumption is crucial for our results. Indeed, if the central
bank can levy type-specific lump-sum taxes, it is always best to implement
the Friedman rule. This is because it is possible to offset any redistribution
induced by monetary policy with an appropriate lump-sum tax or transfer.
Type-specific lump-sum taxes and transfers are not the only way redistri-
bution effects can be undone. Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2003),
Haslag and Martin (2003), and Da Costa and Werning (2003) describe other
mechanisms which produce the same result.
In the models we consider, the policy maker who chooses the rate of
growth of the money supply is faced with different types of agents and can
assign different weights to each type. Hence, we consider ex-post social wel-
fare. Since it is possible to specify a social welfare function which puts
enough weight on the type that benefits from such a deviation, it follows
ex-post social welfare may not be maximized at the Friedman rule.3
3Under a different approach we could have appealed to a political economy criterion.
For example, we could assume agents vote on their preferred policy. We can show, for
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Our work is part of a growing literature studying environments (with
heterogeneity) in which the Friedman rule is not optimal (see, for exam-
ple, Levine 1991, Molico 1999, Deviatov and Wallace 2001, Smith (2002a,b),
Edmonds 2002, Green and Zhou 2002). These papers consider an ex-ante
welfare criterion and argue the Friedman rule might not be optimal from
such a standpoint. In other words, their analysis assumes that agents “pick
their preferred monetary policy under a “veil of ignorance”, before knowing
their true identity” [Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000)]. In contrast, we present
results using a ex-post welfare criterion and can therefore better capture the
“conflict of interest” between different types of agents that a benevolent pol-
icy maker has to consider. Our paper is also related to recent work that
studies the impact of agent heterogeneity on monetary policy. Kocherlakota
(2002) shows monetary policy should react to the degree of heterogeneity in
the economy. Berentsen, Camera, and Waller show a one shot deviation from
the Friedman rule might increase ex-ante welfare in a search economy of the
type introduced by Lagos and Wright (2002).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2, 3, and 4 describe
the search and matching economy, the turnpike economy, and the overlapping
generations economy, respectively. Section 5 concludes. The money-in-the-
utility function economy and proofs of certain results are relegated to the
each of the economies we study, examples where at least 50 percent of the agents prefer
a deviation from the Friedman rule. Alternatively, we could assume agents influence the
choice of monetary policy by spending resources lobbying. For example, the “distance”
between a group’s preferred policy and the chosen policy could depend on the ratio of
resources this group spends lobbying to the total resources spent lobbying. The Friedman
rule will not be chosen for any such rule that implements a policy strictly between different
group’s preferred policies. In this paper, however, we limit ourselves to showing Pareto
incomparable allocations can arise.
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appendices.
2 A search economy
This section considers a search model of the type introduced by Lagos and
Wright (2002, hereafter, LW).4 Time is discrete and there is a continuum of
mass 1 of infinitely-lived agents. Each period is divided in two sub-periods.
It is assume that there are two types of goods: special goods which are traded
in a decentralized market during the first sub-period and general goods which
are traded in a centralized market during the second sub-period.
We consider each market in turn, starting with the centralized market. As
in LW, preferences in the centralized market are assumed to be quasi-linear,
so that the utility from consuming an amount X and producing an amount
H is given by U(X) − AH, where U is twice continuously differentiable,
U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, and A > 0. As in LW, is also assumed U is unbounded and
U ′(X∗) = 1 for X∗ ∈ (0,∞) with U(X∗) > X∗.
In the decentralized market, agents only consume and produce a subset of
the goods. Agents do not produce the goods they like to consume. We assume
there are no double coincidence of wants and denote by σ the probability of a
single coincidence of wants. Unlike the standard LW model, agents also differ
in how much they value special goods relative to general goods. The utility
derived by a type-α agent from consuming an amount x and producing an
amount h is given by αu(x)− c(h), where α > 0, u and c are at least thrice
continuously differentiable, u(0) = c(0) = 0, u′ > 0, c′ > 0, u′′ < 0, c′′ ≥ 0,
4We are indebted to Randy Wright for showing us how to work out the example in this
section.
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and u(q¯) = c(q¯) for some q¯ > 0.
A central bank can expands or contracts the money supply via lump-sum
transfers or taxes, denoted by τ , during the centralized market. The money
supply evolves according to Mt = (1 + z)Mt−1. Hence, τ = zMt−1.
Let Wα(m) be the value function for a type α agent entering the central-
ized market with money m and Vα(m) be the value function for this agent
entering the decentralized market with money m. The problem of an agent
in the centralized market is
Wα(m) = max
X,H,m+
{U(X)− AH + βVα(m+)}
subject to
X = ωH + φ(m+ τ −m+), (1)
where ω denotes the real wage, φ is the inverse of the price level, and m+
is the money carried out of the market. We assume ω is fixed; for example,
because of a linear technology.
Assuming an interior solution, we can substitute for H to get
Wα(m) = max
X,m+
{
U(X)− A
ω
[
X − φ(m+ τ −m+)]+ βVα(m+)} .
The first order conditions for X and m+ are, respectively,
U ′(X) =
A
ω
, (2)
Aφ
ω
= βV ′α(m
+). (3)
Also notice Wα(m) is linear since W
′
α(m) =
Aφ
ω
for all m. As in LW, the cost
of producing H is linear, X and m+ are independent of m. Hence, if there
is only one type, all agents consume the same amount and leave the market
8
with the same money holdings. With more than one type, however, m+ may
depend on α as can be seen from (3).
We now turn to the decentralized market. Let the joint distribution of
money and types in this market be given by F (m˜, e˜). The above analysis
shows F is degenerate conditional on types. In other words, all type-α agents
exit the centralized market with the same amount of money m+α and thus
enter the decentralized market with the same amountmα. Hence, it is enough
to know the distribution of types G(α˜).
We can write the value function for an type-α agent entering the decen-
tralized market with money m as
Vα(m) = σ
∫
{−c[qα˜(mα˜)] +Wα[m+ dα˜]} dG(α˜)
+σ {αu[qα(m)] +Wα[m− dα(m)]}+ (1− 2σ)Wα(m).
This expression states that with probability σ, the agent is a seller who
produces a quantity qα˜(mα˜) of special goods in exchange for dα˜ units of
money. With probability σ the agent is a buyer who consumes qα(m) units
of special goods acquired with dα(m) units of money. In particular, we have
assumed the terms of trade q and d depend on the buyer’s but not the seller’s
money balances, as is standard in this kind of model. We have also assumed,
as will be verified below, the terms of trade depend on the buyer’s but not
the seller’s type. Now take the partial derivative of the above expression with
respect to m:
V ′α(m) = σ
∫
+W ′α[m+ dα˜(mα˜)]dG(α˜) + σαu
′[qα(m)]q′α(m)
+σ[1− d′α(m)]W ′α[m− dα(m)] + (1− 2σ)W ′α(m).
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Recall W ′α(m) =
Aφ
ω
for all m, so we can write
V ′α(m) = σαu
′[qα(m)]q′α(m) + [1− σd′α(m)]
Aφ
ω
. (4)
Hence, V ′α(m) depends on an agent’s own type, α, and money holding, m,
but not on other agents type and money holdings.
As in LW, we assume the terms of trade are determined by the generalized
Nash solution where the buyer has bargaining power θ and the threat points
are given by the continuation values. First, note for any real d and any type
α, Wα(m + d)−Wα(m) = dAφω . It follows the terms of trade (q, d) between
a buyer of type α with money holding m and a seller of any type is given by
max
q,d
[
αu(q)− dAφ
ω
]θ [
−c(q) + dAφ
ω
]1−θ
subject to d ≤ m. Thus, as claimed above, the terms of trade do not depend
on the seller’s type.
As in LW, it can be shown that in any equilibrium it must be the case
d = m. In order to find q, we take the partial derivative of the above
expression with respect to q and set it equal to zero. This implies q = qα(m)
is the solution to
m
Aφ
ω
= gα(q), (5)
where gα(q) is defined as
gα(q) ≡ θαu
′(q)c(q) + (1− θ)αu(q)c′(q)
θαu′(q) + (1− θ)c′(q) .
For example, if the buyer has all the bargaining power, so θ = 1, this expres-
sion reduces to gα(q) = c(q).
In the general case, implicit differentiation yields
q′α(m) =
Aφ
ωg′α(q)
. (6)
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We can substitute this expression, as well as d′α(m) = 1, into V
′
α(m), given
by equation (4). Then, with equation (3), we get
Aφ
ω
= β
{
σαu′(q+α )
Aφ+
ωg′α(q+α )
+ (1− σ)Aφ
+
ω
}
,
where we use the superscript + to denote next period. Since we focus on
steady states, we know q is constant and φ = (1+z)φ+. The above expression
then reduces to
1 + z = β
[
σ
αu′(qα)
g′α(qα)
+ (1− σ)
]
. (7)
This expression determines the equilibrium value of qα for an agent of type
α. From equation (5) we get mα =
ωgα(qα)
Aφ
.
We can simplify expression (7) further. Define β ≡ 1/(1 + r) and the
nominal interest rate (1 + i) = (1 + z)(1 + r). Then we can write
1 +
i
σ
=
αu′(qα)
g′α(qα)
.
The price φ can be obtained through the money market clearing condition∫
mαdG(α) = M , since the qα’s are determined by equation (7).
Now let mˆα denote the money with which an agent of type α enters the
centralized market. mˆα will depend on the type of meeting the agent was in
during the previous decentralized market. In that market, the agent might
have been either a seller, or a buyer, or no trade occurred. Hence,
mˆα =

0 with probability σ,
mα with probability 1− 2σ,
mα +mα˜ with probability σG(α˜).
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Since mˆα varies across agents according to their type, so must Hα. Indeed,
we can rewrite equation (1) as follows
ωHα = X − φ(mˆα + τ −m+α ).
A similar expression must hold for the average mˆα across type α agents,
which is given by m¯α = (1− σ)mα + σM . Hence, we have
ωH¯α = X − φ(m¯α + τ −m+α )
= X − φ(σ + z)(M −mα), (8)
where we have made use of the fact that m+α = (1 + z)mα, in steady state,
and τ = zM .
Note X is the same across type and is thus independent of the rate of
growth of the money supply z. Assume φ is fixed for a moment, for any
type α holding less than the average money balances M an increase in z will
reduce expected hours H¯α. Since H enters the utility function linearly this
increases expected utility. Clearly the opposite is true for any type holding
more than the average money balances.
This can be illustrated by a simple example. Assume preferences are
ln(X) − H in the centralized market and αi ln(x) − h in the decentralized
market, with αi ∈ {αL, αH}, αL < αH . The two types L and H have equal
mass. We also assume θ = 1 so buyers make take-it-or-leave-it offers. Under
this assumption, equation (5) implies
m
φ
ω
= q.
It is easy to verify that equation (7) becomes
1 + z = β
[
σα
1
qα
+ (1− σ)
]
.
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Thus the expressions for qα and mα are given by
qα =
αβσ
[1 + z − β(1− σ)]
and
mα =
ω
φ
αβσ
[1 + z − β(1− σ)] .
The money market clearing condition is
M =
1
2
βσ
[1 + z − β(1− σ)]
ω
φ
(αL + αH) .
This determines the price φ. With a little algebra we can write equation (8)
for type L as
H¯αL = 1−
1
2
βσ(σ + z)
[1 + z − β(1− σ)] (αH − αL) .
Let Γ ≡ (σ + z)/ [1 + z − β(1− σ)]. Since αH > αL, average hours for type
L will decrease if ∂Γ/∂z > 0.
∂Γ
∂z
=
1 + z − β(1− σ)− (σ + z)
[1 + z − β(1− σ)]2 ,
which is positive for β ∈ (0, 1).
We can summarize these result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Increasing the rate of the money supply creates a transfer
from types with high α to types with low α which can make types with low α
better off.
If φ is kept fixed, it is easy to see how the transfer operates; a higher
z allows types with low α to work less. Of course, in equilibrium, φ will
decrease, which makes all types worse off. However, this partial equilibrium
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effect is more than compensated for by the transfer for α sufficiently low.
Agents with such low values of α are made better off by a deviation from
the Friedman rule. Hence, different values of z give Pareto incomparable
allocations. It is easy, by putting sufficient weight on the utility of types
with a low α to write a social welfare function that is not maximized at
z = β − 1.
This is true despite the fact that, as in LW, it can be shown from equation
(7) that the Friedman rule generates the second best equilibrium in terms of
efficiency. Further, if θ = 1, so that there is no hold up problem associated
with bargaining, then equation (7) yields gα(q) = c(q) whenever z = β. This
implies the first best, αu′(qα) = c′(qα).
Because increasing z reduces the utility of both types of agents, the Fried-
man rule would be optimal if it were possible to achieve the transfer from
types with high α to types with low α through other, less distorting, means.
For example, assume type-specific lump-sum taxes and subsidies are avail-
able. It is possible to implement a transfer, by taxing high-α types and
subsidizing low-α types, without increasing z. Hence a necessary condition
for the Friedman rule to be suboptimal ex-post is that changes in the rate of
growth of the money supply have redistributive effects.
3 A Turnpike Model
This section studies a version of the turnpike model developed in Townsend
(1980) and described in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000). Time is indexed by
t = 0, 1, 2, ..., there is a single, perishable consumption good and a countably
14
infinite number of infinitely-lived agents. There are two types of agents dif-
fering in their endowment patterns. Specifically, type-E agents are endowed
with 1 unit of the consumption good at even dates and nothing at odd dates.
Type-O agents are endowed with 1 unit of the consumption good at odd
dates and nothing at even dates. Each type-O agent is endowed with M0
units of fiat money at date 0.
We restrict market participation in two ways. First, at each date t, there
is a single pairing of one type-E and one type-O populating a market. Sec-
ond, a type-E will be paired with the specific type-O agents only once.5
These restrictions, combined with the absence of any common agent or in-
termediary, eliminates the possibility of debt issues. In what follows, the
utility function u is assumed to be CRRA and is described as
u(c) =
c1−ρ
1− ρ (9)
where c is consumption.
3.1 The type E agent’s problem
The problem of type E agents can be written recursively as follows:
v(m) = maxu(c) + βu(c′) + β2v(m′′),
subject to
c+ pim′ = 1 + τ +m, (10)
c′ + pim′′ = τ +m′, (11)
5We define IE = [1E , 2E , ...] and JO = [1O, 2O, ...]. Let iE ∈ IE and jO ∈ JO. Then iE
is paired with jO only once.
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where c is consumption in even periods and c′ is consumption in odd periods,
m is the amount of real money balances the agent holds at the beginning of
an even period, τ is a real lump-sum money transfer from the government
which is positive if the money supply grows and negative if it shrinks, and
pi is the inflation rate (the ratio of tomorrow’s price to today’s price; in this
stationary environment, it is also the rate of growth of the money supply).
We know if pi > β, then m = m′′ = 0. The first order conditions imply
piu′(c) = βu′(c′), (12)
which using (9) yields
c′
c
=
(
β
pi
)ρ
, (13)
while (11) yields
c+ pic′ = I (14)
where I ≡ 1 + τ + piτ . It is easy to verify that
c =
I
1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ , (15)
c′ =
(
β
pi
)ρ
I
1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ . (16)
3.2 The type O agent’s problem
Similarly, the problem of type O agents can be written as
v(m¯) = maxu(c¯) + βu(c¯′) + β2v(m¯′′),
subject to
c¯+ pim¯′ = τ + m¯, (17)
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c¯′ + pim¯′′ = 1 + τ + m¯′, (18)
where c¯ is consumption in even periods and c¯′ is consumption in odd periods,
m¯ is the real money balances the agent holds at the beginning of an even
period, and τ and pi are as defined above.
We know if pi > β, then m¯′ = 0. Standard aforedescribed arguments yield
c¯ =
I
pi +
(
pi
β
)ρ , (19)
c¯′ =
(
pi
β
)ρ
I
pi +
(
pi
β
)ρ . (20)
We can combine equations (15) and (19) to get
c¯
[
pi +
(
pi
β
)ρ]
= c
[
1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ]
.
Feasibility requires that c+ c¯ = 1, and so
c =
pi +
(
pi
β
)ρ
pi +
(
pi
β
)ρ
+ 1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ ,
c′ =
1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ
pi +
(
pi
β
)ρ
+ 1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ .
It can be shown that c → c′ as pi → β. Moreover, the gap between c and
c′ increases for all pi. Why is there a gap between c and c′? The reason has
to do with the odd-even endowment pattern. If the return to money is less
than unity, an agent is always better off receiving a unit of endowment earlier
than later, since a unit invested in money earns less than the value of the
investment itself. As pi increases, the return to money falls thereby increasing
the gap between odd and even period consumption.
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3.3 Evaluating type E agents’ welfare
Consider the start of an even date. At such a date, the type E agent would
prefer a contraction in the money growth rate while a type O agent would
prefer no inflation. A contraction would enable the type E agent to get a high
return on his investment in money and he enjoys that in a period in which
he gets a high endowment. Neither agent likes positive inflation though.
Formally, the welfare of a type E agent is given by
UE =
∞∑
t=0
β2t [u(c) + βu(c′)] =
1
1− β2 [u(c) + βu(c
′)] . (21)
For future use, note that
∂u(c)
∂pi
=
[
pi +
(
β
pi
)ρ]−ρ
ρ
[
1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ] [
1 + 1
pi
(
pi
β
)ρ]
[
pi +
(
pi
β
)ρ
+ 1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ]2−ρ
and
∂u(c′)
∂pi
= −
[
1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ]−ρ
ρ
[
1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ] [
1 + 1
pi
(
pi
β
)ρ]
[
pi +
(
pi
β
)ρ
+ 1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ]2−ρ . (22)
Since
∂UE
∂pi
=
1
1− β2 [
∂u(c)
∂pi
+ β
∂u(c′)
∂pi
], (23)
we have
∂UE
∂pi
= 0⇔
[
pi +
(
β
pi
)ρ]−ρ
− β
[
1 + pi
(
β
pi
)ρ]−ρ
= 0. (24)
Below we prove the welfare of type E agents is not maximized at pi = β.
Proposition 2 If ρ = 1, or u(c) = ln(c), then ∂UE/∂pi = 0 ⇔ pi = 1. If
ρ < 1 , then ∂UE/∂pi = 0 for some value of pi > 1. Conversely, if ρ > 1,
then ∂UE/∂pi = 0 for some value of pi ∈ (β, 1).
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Proof. These results are immediate from equation (24).
Proposition 2 shows type-E agents benefit if the central bank chooses a
money growth rate greater than that prescribed by the Friedman rule. Thus,
if the central bank puts enough weight on the welfare of type E agents, it
will choose z > β.
As in the economy of the previous section an increase in the rate of growth
of the money supply has two effects. First, it reduces the utility of all agents
as it makes their consumption more volatile (c deviates more from c′, which
hurts any risk-averse agent). On the other hand, it creates a transfer from
type O to type E agents. If the money stock does not grow too fast, the
value of the transfer to type E agents exceeds the cost in terms of volatility
of consumption.
Also, as in the previous economy, the Friedman rule would be optimal
if it were possible to make transfers that are less distorting. The type of
transfer described in the previous section can be implemented if type-specific
lump-sum transfers are feasible. Hence, again, a necessary condition for the
Friedman rule to be suboptimal ex-post is that changes in the rate of growth
of the money supply have redistributive effects.
4 A OG Model with random relocation
We consider a model economy in which money is valued because of limited
communication across two spatially separated locations. Only a succinct
description of the economic environment is provided; the interested reader is
referred to Schreft and Smith (2002) and Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell
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(2004) for more details.
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 1, 2... The world is divided into two
spatially separated locations. Each location is populated by a continuum of
agents of unit mass. Agents live for two periods, and receive an endowment
of ω units of the single consumption good when young and nothing when
old. There also is an initial old generation whose members are endowed with
an amount of cash M0. Only old-age consumption is valued. Let ct denote
old-age consumption of the members of the generation born at date t; their
lifetime utility is given by u(ct) =
c1−ρt
1−ρ , where ρ ∈ (0, 1).
After receiving their endowment and placing it into a bank, agents learn
whether they must move to the other location or not. Let α denote the
probability that an individual will be relocated. We assume a law of large
number holds so α is also the measure of agents that are relocated. α is the
same on both islands so that moves across location are symmetric. Movers
redeem their bank deposits in the form of money as this is the only way for
them to acquire goods in the new location. In contrast, nonmovers redeem
their deposits in the form of goods. Goods deposited in the bank can be
used to acquire money from old agents belonging to the previous generation
or put into storage. Each unit of the consumption good put into storage at
date t yields x > 1 units of the consumption good at date t + 1, where x is
a known constant.
The CB can levy lump-sum taxes τ on the endowment of agents by col-
lecting the tax in the form of money balances removed from the economy. In
contrast, a lump-sum subsidy is received in the form of a money injection.
The money supply evolves according to Mt+1 = (1 + z)Mt and z is chosen
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by the CB in a manner that will be explained below. We assume x > 1
1+z
implying that money is a bad asset. Let pt denote the time t price level; in
steady states, pt+1 = (1 + z) pt. Also, since we focus on steady-states, we
drop the time subscript in what follows.
Agents deposit their entire after-tax/transfer endowments with a bank.
The bank chooses the gross real return it pays to movers, dm, and to non-
movers, dn. In addition, the bank chooses values m (real value of money
balances) and s (storage investment) respectively. These choices must sat-
isfy the bank’s balance sheet constraint
m+ s ≤ ω − τ. (25)
Banks behave competitively, so they take as given the return on their in-
vestments. In particular, the return on real money balances is pt/pt+1. If
x > pt/pt+1 banks will want to hold as little liquidity as possible since money
is dominated in rate of return. If x = pt/pt+1, banks are indifferent be-
tween money and storage. In this case, we consider the limiting economy as
pt/pt+1 → x.
Banks must have sufficient liquidity to meet the needs of movers. This is
captured by the following expression:
αdm(ω − τ) ≤ m
1 + z
. (26)
A similar condition for non-movers, who consume all the proceeds from the
storage technology, is given by
(1− α)dn(ω − τ) ≤ xs. (27)
Banks maximize profits. Because of free entry, banks choose in equilibrium
their portfolio in a way that maximizes the expected utility of a representative
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depositor. The bank’s problem is written as
max
dm,dn
(ω − τ)1−ρ
1− ρ
{
α (dm)1−ρ + (1− α) (dn)1−ρ} (28)
subject to equations (25), (26), and (27).
Let γ ≡ m
ω−τ denote the bank’s reserve-to-deposit ratio. Then, since equa-
tions (25), (26), and (27) hold with equality, the bank’s objective function is
to choose γ to maximize
(ω − τ)1−ρ
1− ρ
{
αρ
[
γ
1 + z
]1−ρ
+ (1− α)ρ [(1− γ)x]1−ρ
}
. (29)
Bhattacharya, Guzman, Huybens, and Smith (1997) show that the reserve
to deposit ratio chosen by the bank is given by
γ =
1[
1 + 1−α
α
{(1 + z)x} 1−ρρ
] (30)
and that it increases as 1 + z decreases. For the initial old, consumption
is equal to the real value of money balances. Let M0 denote the quantity
of nominal money balances held by a member of the initial old generation.
Then, c01 =
M0
p1
, where p1 =
(1+z)M0
γ(ω−τ) . Note, in equilibrium, the reserve-
to-deposit ratio and the lump-sum tax are functions of the money growth
rate. At a steady state, the central bank maximizes the following objective
function
W (z) = (1− β)
(
M0
p1
)1−ρ
1− ρ + β
{Ω(z)}1−ρ
1− ρ Γ(z)
where Ω(z) := ω− τ (z), and Γ(z) := αρ
[
γ(z)
1+z
]1−ρ
+(1−α)ρ [(1− γ (z))x]1−ρ.
This allows us to find the rate of growth of the money supply chosen by
the central bank under different assumptions about the weight of the initial
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old generation and, in a steady state, all other generations. For example,
if β = 0, then the central bank only considers the utility of the initial old.
Conversely, as β → 1, the weight of the initial old goes to zero and so the
central bank maximizes the utility of a representative generation (in steady
states) and completely ignores the initial old.
For future reference, note that, in steady states,
−τ = Mt −Mt−1
pt
= −m
(
z
1 + z
)
m = γ (ω − τ) = γω (1 + z)
(1 + z)− γz
and hence,
M0
p1
=
M1
p1
M0
M1
= m
1
1 + z
=
γω
(1 + z)− γz .
Proposition 3 The optimal rate of growth of the money supply is given by
z = 1 +
1− β
β
γ
αρ
,
where γ is computed from (30), along with the constraint that 1 + z ≥ 1
x
.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is straightforward to see that if β → 1, then z → 1. As β → 0, in the
limit the weight is all on the initial old; the constraint 1 + z ≥ 1
x
eventually
binds and the central bank implements the Friedman rule.
Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2004) and Haslag and Martin (2003)
study how an increase in the rate of growth of the money supply away from
the Friedman rule creates a transfer from agents who hold money to those
who do not. Indeed this effect may dominate the negative effects of a higher
money growth rate and can render the Friedman rule suboptimal. As in the
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previous economies, here, deviations from the Friedman rule also come at
a cost since the difference in consumption between movers and nonmovers
increases as the rate of growth of the money supply increase. When the
money stock does not grow too fast, the value of the transfer exceeds the cost
created by the volatility in consumption. Edmond (2002) has a comparable
result. Again, the sub-optimality of the Friedman rule hinges crucially on the
assumption that it is not possible to undo the transfers created by changes
in the rate of growth of the money supply. Bhattacharya, Haslag and Russell
(2004) show that when these transfers can be undone, the Friedman rule is
once again optimal. Hence, once again, a key component of the explanation
for why the Friedman rule is suboptimal (ex-post) here is that changes in the
rate of growth of the money supply have unremovable redistributive effects.
Note also that unlike in the two economies studied above, here the Friedman
rule is additionally sub-optimal ex-ante as shown in Smith (2002).
5 Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we consider steady state monetary policy in several alternative
economic environments: two economies with infinitely-lived agents and an
overlapping-generations economy.6 We provide examples where the Fried-
man rule is not the ex-post welfare maximizing monetary policy in these
economies. To varying degrees, these results are known in the literature.
Certainly this is true in the overlapping generations economy. Our aim is to
explain why the welfare maximizing policy is not the Friedman rule in each
6In addition, we study a money-in-the-utility-function economy in the appendix.
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case. Indeed, our main contribution is to offer one common explanation to
account for the shared monetary policy results.
An key characteristic of the models we considered is that agents have
heterogenous money holding. This heterogeneity arises from differences in
agents’ preferences in the Lagos-Wright (2002) framework (as well as in the
money-in-the-utility-function economy). It is generated by differences in en-
dowment patterns in the turnpike economy. Finally, differences in the age of
agents living during the same period are responsible for this heterogeneity
in the OG framework (old agents may hold money while young agents do
not). In each case, a change in the rate of growth of the money supply has a
redistributive effect. As money growth rises, for example, agents who hold a
disproportionately large amount of money see the real value of their money
holdings diminish. At the same time agents who are holding comparatively
less money benefit from the change in money growth because they are able to
consume more. In each case, we provided an example where an increase in the
rate of growth of the money supply creates Pareto incomparable allocations.
Heterogeneity, therefore, plays an important role in explaining why the
Friedman rule does not maximize ex-post steady-state welfare in a variety of
economic settings. In an infinitely-lived-representative-agent economy, het-
erogeneity is suppressed; agents are identical and therefore hold the same
levels of money balances in steady state. A second important assumption in
each of the economies considered is that markets are incomplete so agents, or
the monetary authority, are unable to undo the redistribution caused by an
increase in the rate of growth of the money supply away from the Friedman
rule. For example, in each of the environments we consider, the Friedman
25
rule would be optimal if type-specific lump-sum taxes were available.
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Appendix
A A money-in-the-utility-function economy
This section considers a money-in-the-utility function economy with two
types of agents who differ in the marginal utility they receive from real
balances. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, ... The economy is
populated by a continuum, of unit mass, of infinitely-lived agents. As men-
tioned above, the population is divided into two groups. Let µ be the measure
of agents that place a relatively high value on the services from real money
holdings and 1− µ is the measure of agents that place a relatively low value
on the services of real money holdings. This distinction will be made precise
below.
There are two assets in the economy, money and capital. There is a single
consumption good which is perishable. It can be transformed into capital at
a one-for-one rate or used to acquire money balances. Agents can produce
the consumption good with capital accumulated up to date-t, denoted kt−1,
using a technology f (kt−1). The function f has the following properties:
f ′ (kt−1) > 0, f
′′
(kt−1) < 0, limk→0 f ′ (kt−1) = ∞, and limk→∞ f ′ (kt−1) =
0. In addition, undepreciated capital can be converted into units of the
consumption good at a one-for-one rate. We use δ to denote the capital
depreciation rate.
The government has a balanced budget period by period. At each date t ≥
0, the government finances a lump-sum tax or transfer, denoted τ , by altering
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the money supply. Formally, the date-t government budget constraint is:
τt =
Mt−Mt−1
pt
, where Mt denotes the per-capita quantity of nominal money
at date t and pt is the price level at that date. We assume the government
follows a money supply rule such that Mt = (1 + zt)Mt−1, where zt > −1.
The money supply expands if zt > 0, so that τt > 0. Conversely, the money
supply contracts if −1 < zt < 0, so that τt < 0.
All agents maximize the discounted sum of momentary utilities over an
infinite horizon. Agents who place a relatively high value on the services
of real money balances are referred to as type H, while those who place a
relatively low value on the services are referred to as type L. The preferences
of the type-i where i = H,L agents are represented by
U =
∞∑
t=0
βtui (ct,mt) i = H,L, (31)
where 0 < β < 1 is the agent’s subjective time rate of preference, c is the
quantity of the consumption good and mt ≡ Mtpt is the quantity of real money
balances. We assume uij > 0 and u
i
jj < 0, i = L,H, j = m, c, where u
i
j ≡ ∂u
i
∂j
and uijj ≡ ∂
2ui
∂j2
. There exists a satiation level of real money balances such that
uHm
(
c,m∗H
)
= uLm
(
c,m∗L
)
= 0. Further, we assume uHm (cˆ, mˆ) > u
L
m (cˆ, mˆ),
∀mˆ ≤ m∗H , uHc (cˆ, mˆ) = uLc (cˆ, mˆ) and uicm = 0 for i = L,H. In words, for
the same values of consumption and real balances, the type-H derives greater
marginal utility from the services associated with money than does a type-
L agent but there is no difference in the marginal utility of consumption.
Lastly, we assume the momentary utility is separable in consumption and
real money balances for both types of agents.
There are two problems, one for each type of agent. Formally, the maxi-
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mization problem for the type-i agents, i = L,H is represented by
∞∑
t=0
βtui
(
cit,m
i
t
)
s.t. f
(
kit−1
)
+ (1− δ) kit−1 +
mit−1
1 + pit
+ τt ≥ cit + kit +mit, (32)
where pit ≡ pt−pt−1pt−1 and stands for the (net) inflation rate. Let ait ≡ f
(
kit−1
)
+
(1− δ) kit−1 + m
i
t−1
1+pit
+ τt, i = L,H. The problem for an agent of type i can be
written in recursive form. Bellman’s equation is:
V i (at) = max
{
ui (ct,mt) + βV
i (at+1)
}
, i = H,L.
Since kit = a
i
t − cit − mit, the unconstrained maximization problem can be
written as
V i (at) = max
 ui (cit,mit)+βV i [f (ait − cit −mit) + (1− δ) (ait − cit −mit) + mit1+pit+1 + τt]

We also impose the following transversality conditions:
lim
T→∞
βTuic
(
ciT ,m
i
T
)
kT = lim
T→∞
βTuic
(
ciT ,m
i
T
)
mT = 0. (33)
The first-order necessary conditions for agent i′s problem are:
uic
(
cit,m
i
t
)− β [f ′ (kit)+ (1− δ)]V ia (ait+1) = 0, (34)
uim
(
cit,m
i
t
)− β [f ′ (kit)+ (1− δ)]V ia (ait+1)+ βV ia (at+1)1 + pit+1 = 0, (35)
and the envelope condition is
V ia (at) = u
i
c
(
cit,m
i
t
)
. (36)
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Update equation (36) by one period and substitute it into equations (34)
and (35), to get
uic
(
cit,m
i
t
)− β [f ′ (kit)+ (1− δ)]uic (cit+1,mit+1) = 0, (37)
uim
(
cit,m
i
t
)− β [f ′ (kit)+ (1− δ)]uic (cit+1,mit+1)+ βuic (cit+1,mit+1)1 + pit+1 = 0.
(38)
We can solve the first-order necessary conditions specifically for a money
demand function. Let mdH (ωt) and m
dL (ωt) represent the money demand
for type-H and type-L agents respectively. Here, ω is used to stand for the
variables that the agents will take as given; namely, the state variables, the
price level and the policy variables. Formally, ωt =
{
kHt , k
L
t , pt, τt, zt
}
.
The money market clearing condition can be represented as follows:
Mt = pt
[
µmdH (ωt) + (1− µ)mdL (ωt)
]
(39)
In steady state, consumption, capital, and real money balances are con-
stant over time so that cit = c¯
i, kit = k¯
i, mit = m¯
i, for all t. In addition, the
government fixes the money supply growth rate such that zt = z for all t.
Hence, τt = τ . From equation (37), we have
uic
(
c¯i, m¯i
)
= β
[
f ′
(
k¯i
)
+ (1− δ)]uic (c¯i, m¯i) . (40)
It follows 1/β =
[
f ′
(
k¯i
)
+ (1− δ)]. The implication is that in the steady
state both type of agents hold the same amount of capital. To reduce nota-
tion, let k¯ ≡ k¯H = k¯L.
We now show the lump-sum transfers/taxes are given by τ = z
1+z
m¯. We
can express the government’s lump-sum taxes as a function of the money
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growth rate: τt =
(1+zt)Mt−1−Mt−1
pt
= ztMt−1
pt
. After multiplying the right-
hand-side by pt−1
pt−1
, we get ztMt−1
1+pit
. In steady-state, this expression becomes
τ = z
1+pi
m¯.
We now derive the relationship between the money growth rate and the
inflation rate. Update equation (39) by one period and rearrange to get,
pt+1
pt
=
Mt+1
µmdH(ω¯)+(1−µ)mdL(ω¯)
Mt
µmdH(ω¯)+(1−µ)mdL(ω¯)
= 1 + z.
This follows because the quantity of real money balances demanded by both
type-H and type-L agents are constant over time in steady-state. Thus, we
have the property that pi = z.
Next we combine equations (38), at the steady state, and (40), substitut-
ing for the inflation rate. This yields,
uim (c¯
i, m¯i)
uic (c¯
i, m¯i)
= 1− β
1 + z
. (41)
Thus, agents allocate their resources between consumption, real money bal-
ances, and capital so the marginal return from each is equalized.
With the agent’s budget constraint, it is possible to solve for steady-state
real balances and consumption. More specifically, the steady-state budget
constraint for a type-L agent can be written as
f
(
k¯
)
= δk¯ + c¯L +
z
1 + z
µ
(
m¯L − m¯H) . (42)
Solving for consumption, c¯L, yields
c¯L = f
(
k¯
)− δk¯ − z
1 + z
µ
(
m¯L − m¯H) . (43)
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It is straightforward to see that consumption by type-L may be affected by
a change in the money growth rate. Formally,
∂c¯L
∂z
= − 1
(1 + z)2
µ
(
m¯L − m¯H)− z
1 + z
µ
[
∂m¯L
∂z
− ∂m¯
H
∂z
]
. (44)
Similar steps give the following expression for the consumption of type-H
agents, which is given by
c¯H = f
(
k¯
)− δk¯ − z
1 + z
(1− µ) (m¯H − m¯L) . (45)
Note µc¯H + (1− µ)c¯L = f (k¯)− δk¯. It follows that a change in z will affect
consumption through its effect on
z
1 + z
(
m¯L − m¯H) .
This effect is typically not zero, so a change in the rate of growth of the
money supply creates a change in the amount of consumption enjoyed by
each type.
We now show type-L agents can benefit from an increase in the rate of
growth of the money supply. First we note,
Lemma 1 In steady state, real money balances are decreasing in the money
growth rate.
Proof. Equations (41) and (43) simultaneously determine consumption and
real money balances in steady state for type-H agents. Totally differentiate
both equations to obtain
uHmm
uHc
dmH − u
H
mm
(uHc )
2dc
H =
β
(1 + z)2
dz
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and
dcH = −
(
z
1 + z
)
(1− µ) dmH − 1
(1 + z)2
(1− µ) (mH −mL) dz
After rearranging and writing in Ax = B form, it is straightforward to show
that dm
H
dz
< 0. Since equation (45) has the same structure as equation (43),
it follows immediately that dm
L
dz
< 0.
An increase in z away from the Friedman rule has two effects on the
welfare of agents in this economy. On the one hand it decreases real money
balances, as indicated in lemma 1. This, in turn, decreases the utility of
all agents. However, type-L agents will enjoy more consumption because
there is a transfer from type-H to type-L which is captured by the change in
z
1+z
(
m¯L − m¯H). If this second effect dominates the first, then an increase in
z produces Pareto incomparable allocations. In that case, it is easy to find a
social welfare function that is not maximized at the Friedman rule.
To illustrate this can indeed happen we provide a simple example. Let µ =
.5 and assume both type have the same satiation level of money balances.7
The effect of a change in z on type L ’s utility is
uLc
∂cL
∂z
+ uLm
∂mL
∂z
1
2cL
[
m¯H − m¯L
(1 + z)2
+
z
1 + z
(
∂mH
∂z
− ∂m
L
∂z
)]
+λL
m∗ − m¯L
m∗m¯L
∂mH
∂z
. (46)
Lemma 2 Given our assumptions on preferences, type-H agents will hold
larger real money balances and consume less than type-L agents.
7This is the case, for example, if preferences are given by ui
(
c¯i, m¯i
)
= ln(c¯i) +
λi
(
ln(m¯i)− m¯im∗
)
, where m∗ is the satiation level of real balances which is the same for
both type. Thus, uic = 1/c¯
i and uim = (λ
i/m∗m¯i)
(
m∗ − m¯i).
33
Proof. The marginal rate of substitution on the left-hand side of equation
(41) is equal to a constant on the right-hand side. Imagine that real balances
and consumption were the same for both types. With uHm (c¯, m¯) > u
L
m (c¯, m¯),
uHc (c¯, m¯) = u
L
c (c¯, m¯), the marginal rate of substitution is greater for the type-
H agents. Hence, equal values will not satisfy the agent’s efficiency condition.
Next, consider the case in which m¯H = m¯L, but c¯H 6= c¯L. Equations (43)
and (45), imply that consumption by type-H must equal consumption by
type-L. Hence, we cannot have m¯H = m¯Lwith c¯H 6= c¯L.Next, consider
c¯H = c¯L. For equation (41), the marginal utility of real balances must be
equal across types. By concavity of the utility function, m¯H > m¯L must
hold. Thus, we can rule out the possibility that type-H and type-L will
have equal real money balances or equal consumption levels. We also need
to rule out the possibility that m¯H < m¯L. Note that with m¯H < m¯L, then
uHm
(
c¯H , m¯H
)
> uLm
(
c¯L, m¯L
)
. Moreover, by equations (43) and (45), we know
that c¯H > c¯L. By concavity, it follows that uHc
(
c¯H , m¯H
)
< uLc
(
c¯L, m¯L
)
. It
follows immediately that
uHm(c¯H ,m¯H)
uHc (c¯
H ,m¯H)
>
uLm(c¯L,m¯L)
uLc (c¯
L,m¯L)
. So, equation (41) cannot
be simultaneously satisfied for both type-H and type-L agents.
We can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Welfare of the type-L agents can increase for values of z >
β.
Proof. It is enough to show ∂m
H
∂z
− ∂mL
∂z
> 0, since in that case equation (46)
is positive for small enough values of λL. We know both ∂m
H
∂z
and ∂m
L
∂z
are
negative. Also, the satiation level is the same for each type and it is achieved
whenever z = β. By lemma 2, m¯H > m¯L if z > β. Thus, in a neighborhood
of z = β, it must be the case that ∂m
H
∂z
− ∂mL
∂z
> 0.
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Below we provides another example for the utility functions ui (c¯i, m¯i) =
ln(c¯i) + λi ln(m¯i). For that example, we explicitly derive the money demand
functions so it is possible to obtain an expression for ∂m
H
∂z
and ∂m
L
∂z
.
To summarize the argument, for each type the partial equilibrium effect of an
increase in z is to lower utility. However, there is also a general equilibrium
effect; a transfer from type H to type L that can more than compensate type
L for the partial effect when z is small.
The Friedman rule would be optimal if it were possible to achieve the
transfer from type H to type L through other, less distorting, means. With
type-specific lump-sum taxes and subsidies it is possible to implement a
transfer from type-H to type-L agents, without increasing z. Hence a neces-
sary condition for the Friedman rule to be suboptimal ex-post is that changes
in the rate of growth of the money supply have redistributive effects.
A final example for the MIUF economy is presented below. Assume the
utility functions are ui (c¯i, m¯i) = ln(c¯i)+λi ln(m¯i). In this case, uic = 1/c¯
i and
uim = λ
i/m¯i. To find the expressions for m¯H and m¯L, we solve the following
set of equations:
c¯HλH =
(
1− β
1 + z
)
m¯H , c¯LλL =
(
1− β
1 + z
)
m¯L,
c¯H = Γ(k¯)− z
1 + z
µ
(
m¯H − m¯L) , c¯L = Γ(k¯) + z
1 + z
µ
(
m¯H − m¯L) ,
where Γ(k¯) = f(k¯)−δk¯. With a little algebra it is possible to get the following
expression
m¯i = Γ(k¯)(1 + z)
2µz + 1
λi
(1 + z − β)
(1 + z − β) [µz ( 1
λH
+ 1
λL
)
+ (1 + z − β) 1
λHλL
] .
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From this it is easy to see m¯H > m¯L ⇔ λH > λL. Also,
m¯H
m¯L
=
2µz + 1
λL
(1 + z − β)
2µz + 1
λH
(1 + z − β) .
Since ∂m
i
∂z
< 0, if we show
∂ m¯
H
m¯L
∂z
< 0,
it will imply 0 > ∂m
H
∂z
> ∂m
L
∂z
which in turn means ∂m
H
∂z
− ∂mL
∂z
> 0. After
rearranging, we obtain
∂ m¯
H
m¯L
∂z
= −2µ 1− β[
2µz + 1
λH
(1 + z − β)]2 λ
H − λL
λHλL
< 0.
Thus in this case also, for sufficiently small values of λL type L agents are
better off when z > β. Hence, a deviation from the Friedman rule will in-
crease the utility of type L.
B Proof of proposition 3
First, taking the derivative of equation (28) with respect to γ and setting it
equal to zero yields αρ 1
1+z
(
γ
1+z
)−ρ−(1−α
1−γ
)ρ
x1−ρ = 0. We can rearrange this
expression to get
γ =
[
1 +
1− α
α
((1 + z)x)
1−ρ
ρ
]
.
This is the choice of reserve-to-deposit ratio made by banks.
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Note M0
p1
= γω
1+z−zγ . Substitute this into the central bank’s objective
function. Take the derivative with respect to z, obtaining(
γω
1 + z − zγ
)−ρ [
γ′ω (1 + z − zγ)− γω (1− γ − zγ′)
(1 + z − zγ)2
]
+
β
1− β
Ω1−ρΓ
1 + z
[
1 + z
Ω
∂Ω
∂z
+
1
1− ρ
1 + z
Γ
∂Γ
∂z
]
= 0
It can be verified that
1
1− ρ
1 + z
Γ
∂Γ
∂z
= −γ
and
1 + z
Ω
∂Ω
∂z
=
γ + (1 + z)zγ′
1 + z − γz .
After rearranging, we get(
γω
1 + z − zγ
)−ρ
ω
[
γ′ (1 + z)− γ (1− γ)
(1 + z − zγ)2
]
= − β
1− βΓ
(ω (1 + z))1−ρ
(1 + z − zγ)1−ρ
(1− γ) z
ρ (1 + z − zγ)
which simplifies to
γ1−ρ = − β
1− βΓ (1 + z)
1−ρ z
Note Γ = αρ
(
γ
1+z
)1−ρ
+ (1− α)ρ [(1− γ)x]1−ρ =
(
α
γ
)ρ [
γ
(1+z)1−ρ +
1−γ
x1−ρ
]
.
From the bank’s maximization we have, αρ 1
1+z
(
γ
1+z
)−ρ − (1−α
1−γ
)ρ
x1−ρ = 0,
so that
γ =
β
1− β zα
ρ
which can be rewritten as
1 + z = 1 +
1− β
β
γ
αρ
.
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